Lundquist Institute for Biomedical Innovation
at Harbor-UCLA Medical Center
Institutional Biosafety Committee
Meeting Minutes
02/10/2026
Zoom Virtual Conference

MEMBERS PRESENT	MEMBERS ABSENT
David Applebaum, M.S.	Fawzia Bardag-Gorce, Ph.D.
Rami Doueiri, Ph.D.	Helen Chun, Ph.D.
Scott Filler, M.D.	Fang Wang, Ph.D.
Adrienne Zweifel, Ph.D.	

STAFF PRESENT	STAFF ABSENT
Elizabeth Burrola, CIP	Rosemary Madnick, MBA
Rosa Harmon, CPIA	
Annie Hilo	

1. CALL TO ORDER

The meeting was called to order by Scott Filler, M.D. at 3:02 PM.

2. MEETING MINUTES

The minutes of the January 13, 2026 meeting were presented.

A motion was made and seconded to APPROVE the minutes.

Vote: For - 4, Opposed - 0, Absent – 0, Abstained - 0, Recused – 0

3. BUA REVIEW

a. Amendments

1. **IBC #:** IBC 2024-33443-01
   PI: Selvi Ersoy, Ph.D.
   iRIS Ref #: 063496

Summary: Mice will be infected with study MRSA strains and then treated with various antibiotics to understand their efficacy during skin infection.

Inserts: NA

Vectors: NA

Pathogens: *Staphylococcus aureus*

Risk Assessment: Risk Group 2

Containment: BSL-2

Training: Training has been verified by the Research Compliance Office Staff and EHS.

NIH Guidelines: III-D

Conflicts: NA

Motion: A motion was made and seconded to REQUIRE MODIFICATIONS TO SECURE APPROVAL of the BUA.

Modifications Required to BUA:

1. **Section 5.0 - Description of Experiment(s)/Research**
   - The PI is to revise this section to include the new IACUC# 2026-33230-01 and the work to be performed under this new IACUC project.
   - **Lay Description** - The PI is to define the MRSA acronym the first time it is used.
   - **Experimental Procedures**:
     - The PI is to describe how the MRSA will be cultured (shaking in closed tubes/flasks).
     - The PI is to describe how the lab will be assessing the in vitro work. If the in vitro data has already been collected and the lab will only be assessing the in vivo response, then this is to be explicitly stated in the "Overall Goals" section.
     - The PI is to include the route of inoculations and whether the mice will be anesthetized or awake but restrained.
     - The PI is to state whether the lab will be taking any blood or other samples after the inoculation, but before the experimental endpoint.
     - The PI is to provide the type of homogenizer used in this work.
   - **Hazardous Potential**:
     - The PI is to discuss the routes of transmission as it relates to the hazardous procedures involved (sharps use, inhalation of aerosols, contact with mucous membranes, etc).
     - The PI is to provide the symptoms that may occur should an occupational exposure occur (needlestick, inhalation, mucous membranes, etc).
     - If the antibiotic resistance profiles for these strains are known (beyond methicillin), the PI is to provide information for where this information may be found.

2. **Section 6.0 - Risk Assessment**
   - **Describe Specific Procedures**

  - The PI is to clarify if references to biosafety cabinet (BSC) and biosafety hood are the same thing; it seems that the terms are being used interchangeably in this BUA. The work described in this BUA will not be approved if performed in a fume hood.
  - If the use of the BSC is dependent upon availability, the PI is to provide explicit details how the lab will manage the hazardous procedures when working inside the BSC compared to working outside of a BSC. For instance, will a face shield be used when working inside of the BSC? The PI is to also provide details on PPE for lab work during the culture of the MRSA vs. the animal work.
- NIH Guidelines (Section 6.2) - There is no indication that this work involves recombinant/synthetic nucleic acids but the box for III-D is checked. The PI is to address this discrepancy. If strains are genetically modified in some way, this will need to be described in Sections 5.0, 9.0. and/or 10.0 (depending on the modification).

3. **<u>Section 8.0 - Infectious Agents/Toxins (Excluding Viral Vectors)</u>**
   - For *Staphylococcus aureus*, the PI is to describe inactivation and clarify the treatment method - e.g., Medical Waste (solid waste, sharps), Liquid Waste (10% household bleach).

Vote: For - 4, Opposed - 0, Absent - 0, Abstained – 0, Recused – 0

2. **IBC #:** IBC 2025-U-mRNA AI
   PI: Ashraf Ibrahim, Ph.D.
   iRIS Ref #: 063618

Amendment Summary: The amendment will focus on advancing the dual antigen-based vaccine formulated with CAF01 adjuvant using purified, recombinant *C. albicans* Als3p and Hyr1p proteins provided to the lab by the collaborator.

Inserts: Als3, Hyr1, Nonstructural proteins 1-4, COTH3, Red fluorescent protein (RFP), mCherry, Secreted embryonic alkaline phosphatase (SEAP), Replicase, Beta-Lactamase, Beta-Galactosidase

Vectors: p501

Pathogens: *Candida albicans (*SC5314*), Candida auris (*clades 1-5*), Acinetobacter baumannii, Klebsiella pneumoniae, Staphylococcus aureus, Pseudomonas aeruginosa (*PA01*)*

Risk Assessment: Risk Group 2

Containment: BSL-2

Training: Training has been verified by the Research Compliance Office Staff and EHS.

NIH Guidelines: III-D

Conflicts: NA

Motion: A motion was made and seconded to REQUIRE MODIFICATIONS TO SECURE APPROVAL of the BUA.

Modifications Required to BUA:

1. **Section 4.0 - Background Information**
   - For item 4.4, the PI is to clearly state the training completion date for listed staff.

2. **Section 5.0 - Description of Experiment(s)/Research**
   - The PI is to clearly state IACUC project #2026-23275-01 is being added.
   - The lab confirmed that the "BUA-adjacent vaccine components" are purified recombinant proteins that are provided to the lab andu not purified by the lab so this part of the amendment is exempt. The PI is to remove all exempt information from this section.
   - **Experimental Procedures**:
     - Mentions "challenged with different healthcare-associated infections and assessed by survival or fungal (Candida) /bacterial (Acinetobacter, Pseudomonas, Klebsiella)." The PI is to list the different types of infections that will take place and correct the typo from "or" to "of".
     - The PI is to clarify if all the procedures affiliated with the titer assessments performed on samples that have been taken before the mice have been challenged with infectious agents. If ELISAs are performed on infectious agent-challenged mice, the lab is to submit a BUA amendment for this procedure as this work was not in the previously approved BUA. The procedure for decanting between washes in a plate format must be included, how the lab minimizes splashing or aerosol generation, and the risk mitigation practices involved (use of engineering control, PPE etc).

3. **Section 6.0 - Risk Assessment**
   - According to EH&S records, the BSC in MRL Room 279A was last certified on 06/10/2025. The PI is to revise the BSC certification date.
   - The PI is to confirm if N95 masks are being used and if so, when. Also, confirm that all staff are enrolled in the respiratory protection program (including annual fit testing). In accordance with TLI's Respiratory Protection Program, all employees who are required to wear a N-95 respirator must be trained/re-trained and fit tested annually. The lab is to confirm in the reply to this comment that all staff wearing N95 respirators in an occupational setting are current with these requirements.

Vote: For - 4, Opposed - 0, Absent - 0, Abstained – 0, Recused – 0

3. **IBC #:** IBC 2024-U-SA YX
   PI: Yan Q. Xiong, M.D., Ph.D.
   iRIS Ref #: 063471

Amendment Summary: Adding a new project (IACUC #2026-33349-01, "Translating Phage-Antibiotic Synergy to Combat Multi-Drug-Resistant *Staphylococcus aureus* Infections") and phage cocktail.

Inserts: NA

Vectors: NA

Pathogens: *S. aureus* clinical strain, Phage cocktail

Risk Assessment: Risk Group 2

Containment: BSL-2

Training: Training has been verified by the Research Compliance Office Staff and EHS.

NIH Guidelines: III-D

Conflicts: NA

Motion: A motion was made and seconded to REQUIRE MODIFICATIONS TO SECURE APPROVAL of the BUA.

Modifications Required to BUA:

1. **Section 5.0 - Description of Procedure(s)/Research**

- **Lay Description and Overall Goal**:
  - The PI is to define acronyms the first time they are used (MRSA, PAS).
  - Lay Description - The PI is to provide more details on how the phage cocktail is used to meet the study objective and if any organisms are genetically modified.
  - Overall Goal - The PI is to introduce how the bacteriophage fits into this work and why the lab is using it (lysis of *S. aureus*). If only one phage is being used, the PI is to explicitly state what makes this a "cocktail."
  - Overall Goal - If the lab will be assessing the presence of the bacteriophage in harvested tissue, the PI is to provide a description.
- **Experimental Procedures**:
  - The PI is to provide details on the how the phage is used in this work (prepared in vitro, administered to animals if this occurs, etc).

  - The PI is to move the text "*S. aureus* and phage cocktail should not be transmissible to BRC personnel and PI lab staff utilizing standard handing precaution of animals, tissues, and bacterial and phage cultures" to the Assessment of Hazardous Potential section that follows.
  - If the lab will be purifying the phage, the PI is to discuss the hazardous procedures involved (ultracentrifugation, use of sharps, etc).
- **Hazardous Potential Assessment**:
  - According to lab staff, how does a Biosafety cabinet (BSC) differ from a Biosafety hood? What are the lab's PPE and safe handling practices when working outside of a BSC compared to when working inside a BSC?
  - The PI is to separate the *S. aureus* risk discussion from the phage cocktail risk discussion since *S. aureus* is transmissible to humans. The risk assessment for the materials includes a discussion of the hazards presented by the organisms used, including the likely routes of transmission as it pertains to the experimental procedures, the symptoms of an exposure, and whether treatment is available.
  - The PI is to discuss each phage present in the "phage cocktail," including whether the phages are lysogenic and what the host range of each phage in the cocktail is.
- **Emergency Procedures**:
  - While 70% ethanol may be acceptable for routine benchtop cleaning, 10% bleach is the standard disinfectant used for spills. The PI is to update the narrative to reflect this.
  - The PI is to discuss the response to occupational exposures and limit the discussion to the modes of transmission most likely to occur based on the procedures used (to be represented in the "Hazardous Potential Assessment" section).

2. **Section 6.0 - Risk Assessment**
   - The PI is to update the BSC certification date.
   - **Specific Procedures**:
     - The PI is to replace "should be" with "will be".
     - According to lab staff, how does a Biosafety cabinet (BSC) differ from a Biosafety hood?
     - For item 6.2, the PI is to select III-D (Experiments that Require Institutional Biosafety Committee Approval Before Initiation).

3. **Section 8.0 - Infectious Agents/Toxins (Excluding Viral Vectors)**
   - Name of Agent – The PI is to replace "Phage Cocktail" with all the actual bacteriophages present therein. All phage with the same host range can be grouped into a single entry.
   - Source of Agent – The PI is to replace what's currently written with where the phage cocktail originally came from (unless the lab purified each phage from somewhere). If this is the case, then these procedures need to be discussed in the BUA.

Vote: For - 4, Opposed - 0, Absent - 0, Abstained – 0, Recused – 0

OTHER BUSINESS

a. Safety Committee Report – Accidents/Spills
Mr. Applebaum stated no incidents were reported.

b. Incident Reporting Form
The Committee reviewed the new incident reporting form and identified issues with its structure and wording. They provided recommendations to improve clarity and overall flow. The form will be updated to automatically pull-in BUA numbers, PI names, and other relevant information to enhance accuracy and ease of use. Dr. Zweifel will assist with the revision process to ensure that incident-related questions are clearly written and logically sequenced.

c. TLI IBC Procedures document draft
Tabled for the next meeting due to time constraints.

d. Self-Assessment Tool: Physical Containment – Laboratory Environment section
Tabled for the next meeting due to time constraints.

With no further business, the meeting adjourned at 3:58 PM

Respectfully submitted,

Signed by:
Scott Filler
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Scott Filler, M.D.
Chair, Institutional Biosafety Committee

cc: Research Committee Agenda